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Abstract 
This paper develops a theoretical framework to assess the feasibility of global environmental 
sustainability solutions based on one or more value changes. The framework represents four 
sustainability paradigms (weak sustainability WS, a-growth AG, de-growth DG, strong 
sustainability SS) and five value changes (i.e., a sense of responsibility for nature β, future 
generations γ, or current generations in developing countries δ; aversion to inequality for current 
generations ε or future generations ζ). It defines solutions in terms of consumption, environment 
use, and welfare for representative individuals in both developed (OECD) and developing (non-
OECD) countries. Solutions are characterised by efficiency (i.e., Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks) with 
respect to welfare and by intra- and inter-generational equality for consumption, environment use, 
and welfare, by confirming internal consistency and consistency with alternative equity approaches 
for utilitarianism (i.e., Harsanyi), egalitarianism (i.e., Arneson for welfare; Dworkin for 
consumption or environment use; Sen for consumption and environment use), and contractarianism 
(i.e., Rawls). Theoretical and operational insights are described for alternative sustainability 
paradigms and equity approaches. In terms of feasibility, by considering improved technology θ, 
decreased population η, and modified consumption α, the ordering is γ > δ > ε > ζ and AG > SS > 
DG > WS: β is unfeasible. In terms of internal consistency, γ > δ = ε = ζ and SS > AG > DG: WS is 
internally inconsistent. In terms of consistency with an equity approach, γ > δ = ζ > ε and SS > AG 
> DG > WS. 
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1. Introduction 
Four main sustainability paradigms have been suggested in the literature (Zagonari, 2016): weak 
sustainability, a-growth, de-growth, and strong sustainability. Note that in this context the economic 
general equilibrium framework is similar to weak sustainability, whereas the ecosystem services 
framework is close to strong sustainability. 
Two main value changes have been evoked to achieve sustainability: a sense of responsibility, 
whether this is for nature (Pedersen, 2015; Saniotis, 2012; Van der Werff et al., 2013) or for current 
and future generations (Caselles, 2013; Koukouzelis, 2012); and an aversion to inequality, whether 
this is with respect to current or future generations (Golub et al., 2013; Kopnina, 2016). Note that 
improved environmental technology, a decreased world population, and modified consumption 
patterns can be considered here as context changes for any combination of paradigms and values. 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a model for the four sustainability paradigms within a single 
framework that accounts for changes in the five values (a sense of responsibility for nature, for 
current generations, or for future generations; an aversion to intra- or inter-generational inequality). 
The goal is to assess the feasibility of global environmental sustainability solutions that depend on 
changes in one or more of these values. In particular, analytical and numerical solutions for cases 
based on extreme and estimated parameter values will be characterised using data on the 
consumption level, the direct and indirect use of Earth’s environmental resources (hereafter, 
environment use), and the welfare level for representative individuals in both developed countries 
(i.e., the 35 OECD countries) and developing countries (i.e., the non-OECD countries). This will 
rank solutions in terms of feasibility classes: a reduction in welfare by >25%, by 12.5 to 25%, and 
by <12.5% will be considered unfeasible, slightly feasible, and moderately feasible, respectively, 
whereas an increase in welfare will be considered feasible. 
Moreover, these characterisations will let us identify efficient solutions (i.e., Pareto and Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency with respect to welfare) and measure equality (i.e., inequalities with respect to 
consumption, environment use, and welfare) at both intra- and inter-generational levels. This will 
reveal the internal consistency of the solutions with the assumptions of the four sustainability 
paradigms with respect to equality (e.g., weak sustainability cannot be linked to a large aversion to 
inequality) and efficiency (e.g., weak sustainability must be coupled with Kaldor-Hicks efficiency). 
Finally, these calculations will identify which sustainability solution is consistent with a utilitarian 
approach (i.e., Harsanyi), an egalitarian approach (i.e., Arneson for welfare; Dworkin for 
consumption or environment use; Sen for consumption and environment use), or a contractarian 
approach (i.e., Rawls) (Habib, 2013). This will characterize the sustainability solutions in terms of 
distributive justice (hereafter, equity). 
In other words, this study can be read from a normative perspective so that, for a given 
sustainability paradigm or approach to equity, the framework defines which global environmental 
sustainability conditions should be achieved, if any. Alternatively, this study can be read from a 
positive perspective so that, for any sustainability paradigm or approach to equity, it identifies 
which value changes (i.e., demand policies vs. production policies such as taxes and standards) are 
crucial to meet sustainability conditions. 
Note that all insights about feasible sustainability for the current generation are based on per capita 
data for representative individuals in OECD and non-OECD countries, weighted according to the 
country’s proportion of the world’s population. Moreover, sustainability conditions are checked for 
the main context changes (i.e., improved technology, decreased population, and modified 
consumption). Finally, a current, globally representative individual is compared with a future 
globally representative individual in terms of inter-generational equity and efficiency, without 
splitting future generations into OECD and non-OECD countries. 
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2. Paradigms, concepts, and approaches 
This section concisely defines the four sustainability paradigms, efficiency concepts, and equity 
approaches identified in the Introduction. 
A sustainability solution is Pareto-efficient if current generations in both OECD and non-OECD 
countries obtain greater welfare than in the status quo situation. In other words, there are no losers. 
A sustainability solution is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if current OECD and non-OECD generations 
together obtain greater welfare than in the status quo situation so that the losers can potentially 
receive compensation from the winners. A sustainability solution reduces inequalities between the 
current OECD and non-OECD generations in terms of consumption, environment use, or welfare 
level if the Gini index for one of these variables is smaller than the Gini index for the same variable 
in the status quo situation; this situation is defined as Gini-equitable. A sustainability solution 
improves the conditions for the current non-OECD generation in terms of consumption, 
environment use, or welfare if the minimum value of one variable is larger than its value in the 
status quo situation; this situation is defined MaxMin-equitable. 
The main assumptions behind weak sustainability (i.e., development that meets the needs of the 
present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs) 
can be summarized as follows (Schlör et al., 2015): needs are used as the unit of measurement; the 
same weights are used for current and future generations; and there is unconditional substitution 
among current economic, social, and environmental forms of capital at both intra- and inter-
generational levels. A sustainability solution is consistent with the weak sustainability paradigm if it 
is at least Kaldor-Hicks efficient, and if it assumes small aversion to inter- and intra-generational 
inequality. 
A-growth is an ecological and economic strategy focused on indifference to or neutrality about the 
economic level and growth, with both the economic level and growth considered to be non-robust 
and unreliable indicators of social welfare and progress (Van den Bergh, 2010, 2011). It can be 
characterised as follows: welfare is used as the unit of measurement, as deduced from the aim of 
moving from wrong prices that result from the many neglected non-market transactions (e.g., 
informal activities and relationships) and the many unpriced environmental effects to the right 
prices (i.e., prices that account for both non-market and unpriced values); different weights are used 
for current OECD and non-OECD generations; and substitution between forms of capital is 
possible. A sustainability solution is consistent with the a-growth paradigm if it is Gini-equitable in 
welfare, and if it assumes small aversion to inter-generational and intra-generational inequality. 
De-growth is an ecological and economic perspective based on achieving a socially sustainable and 
equitable reduction (and eventually stabilization) of the materials and energy that a society extracts, 
processes, transports, distributes, consumes, and returns to the environment as wastes (Kallis, 2011; 
Kallis et al., 2012). It can be characterised as follows: happiness is the unit of measurement, with a 
priority on meeting the needs of the poorest individuals, as deduced from the aim of introducing a 
basic income; the same weight is assigned to current and future generations; and substitution among 
forms of capital is acceptable. A sustainability solution is consistent with the de-growth paradigm if 
it is MaxMin-equitable in welfare and if it assumes a large aversion to inter- and intra-generational 
inequality. 
The main assumptions behind strong sustainability (i.e., a development that allows future 
generations to access the same amount of natural resources and the same environmental status as 
the current generation) can be summarized as follows (Jain & Jain, 2013): requirements for some 
incommensurable categories as unit of measurement; possibly assignment of different weights to 
current and future generations; and no substitution between current or future forms of capital, with 
natural and physical or social capital considered to be complementary. A sustainability solution is 
consistent with the strong sustainability paradigm if it is Gini-equitable for consumption and 
environment use, and if it assumes a large aversion to inter- and intra-generational inequality. 
Utilitarianism, in the version considered here (Harsanyi, 1982) can be characterised as follows: 
equally weighting everyone’s welfare, with welfare defined as the satisfaction of rational, well-
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informed, and self-interested preferences, by maximising the total social welfare. A sustainability 
solution is consistent with the utilitarian approach if it is Pareto-efficient or Kaldor-Hicks efficient 
and if it assumes a small aversion to inter- and intra-generational inequality. 
Egalitarianism, in the main three alternative versions that I focus on here, can be summarised as 
follows: it involves (1) levelling of resources or primary goods, as in Dworkin (1981); (2) 
equalising capabilities, as in Sen (1993); or (3) equalising opportunities for welfare, as in Arneson 
(1989). A sustainability solution is consistent with these egalitarian approaches if it assumes a large 
aversion to inter- and intra-generational inequality, and if it is Gini-equitable in consumption or 
environment use for case 1, Gini-equitable in consumption and environment use for case 2, and 
Gini-equitable in welfare for case 3. 
Contractarianism, in the version considered here (Rawls, 1971), can be characterised as follows: it 
arranges social and economic inequalities to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged people by 
opening offices and positions to everybody. A sustainability solution is consistent with the 
contractarian approach if it is MaxMin-equitable for consumption, environment use, or welfare, and 
if it assumes a large aversion to inter- and intra-generational inequality. 
Note that my analysis disregards libertarian approaches, both in terms of positive rights (Lomasky, 
1987) and negative rights (Nozick, 1974), because it is arguable whether future generations or 
nature have rights in this context (Gosseries, 2008). Moreover, sustainability solutions in terms of 
value changes could be turned into policy suggestions; for example, a sense of responsibility for 
nature, for future generations, or for current generations could be translated into expenditures for 
environmental protection, environmental R&D, and aids for poor people. Finally, equality is 
assumed to be instrumental (Kershnar & Purves, 2016), since a value is attached to consequences 
for people. 
3. The model 
This section provides simple formalisations for the four sustainability paradigms identified in 
Section 2 with the goal of requiring as little data as possible about representative individuals in 
OECD and non-OECD countries. For simplicity, and with full recognition that this approach 
ignores some exceptions, I have used the subscript N (northern hemisphere) to label parameters for 
OECD countries and the subscript S (southern hemisphere) for non-OECD countries. Appendix I 
lists all the abbreviations used in this model. 
Let us assume that EN and ES identify the per capita use of the global environment by the current 
OECD and non-OECD generations, respectively. The per capita equilibrium level consistent with 
the current world population is η. Let us assume that XN, XS, and XF identify the per capita 
consumption levels in the OECD current generation, non-OECD current generation, and the future 
generation, respectively. Thus, the use of the environment for the OECD current generation is given 
by EN = θN XN, for the non-OECD current generation is given by ES = θS XS, and for the future 
generation is given by EF = θF XF, where θN, θS, and θF represent the use of the environment for each 
consumption unit for the OECD current generation, non-OECD current generation, and the future 
generation, respectively: θN and θS will be set at current values based on the current technology, and 
then simulated as smaller than current values to analyse the impacts of technological improvement. 
Two main sustainability conditions can be formalised. The weighted sustainability condition 
requires that the use of the environment must be weighted according to the proportions of the global 
population in the OECD and non-OECD countries (pN and pS, respectively): 
𝐸C = 𝑝N𝐸N + 𝑝S𝐸S 
Where EC stands for the total weighted use of the environment by the current generation. The non-
weighted sustainability condition requires that the use of the environment must be averaged 
between the representative individuals in the OECD and non-OECD countries: 
𝐸C = 1 2⁄ 𝐸N + 1 2⁄ 𝐸S 
Thus, in terms of consumption levels, these sustainability conditions become, respectively: 
η = 𝐸C = 𝑝NθN𝑋N + 𝑝SθS𝑋S 
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And 
η = 𝐸C = 1 2⁄ θN𝑋N + 1 2⁄ θS𝑋S 
I will use the non-weighted sustainability condition for the strong sustainability paradigm, and the 
weighted sustainability condition for the other sustainability paradigms. Let us assume that the 
utility for the future generation (UF) depends only on the consumption level: 
𝑈F = 𝑋F
αF 
Where αF represents the future preference for consumption. Indeed, I optimistically assume that 
socioeconomic development will gradually raise non-OECD countries to the same level as the 
OECD countries so that there is no future non-OECD generation and, consequently, future OECD 
countries cannot be concerned about non-OECD countries. Next, I assume that the use of the global 
environment is in its long-run equilibrium so people do not need to feel a responsibility to preserve 
the environment for subsequent generations. Let us assume that the welfare of the current non-
OECD generation (US) depends on their consumption level, the use of the environment, and the 
welfare of the future generation: 
𝑈S = 𝑋S
αS𝐸S
−βS𝑈F
γS 
Where αS represents the preference for consumption, βS represents the degree of concern over use of 
the environment, and γS represents the degree of concern for future generations. Indeed, the current 
non-OECD generation is less affluent, and cannot afford to be heavily concerned with people from 
OECD countries. Let us assume that the welfare of the current OECD generation depends on their 
consumption level, their use of Earth resources, the welfare of the future generation, and the welfare 
of the current non-OECD generation: 
𝑈N = 𝑋N
αN𝐸N
−βN𝑈F
γN𝑈S
δN 
Where αN represents the preference for consumption, βN represents concern over the use of Earth 
resources, γN represents concern for future generations, and δN represents the concern for the current 
non-OECD generation (Lauwers, 2012). In other words, both OECD and non-OECD countries are 
assumed to be concerned about their own environment (i.e., EN and ES, respectively) rather than 
about the overall world environment (i.e., EC = pN EN + pS ES). Indeed, non-OECD countries might 
not be concerned about the environment in the OECD countries, whereas OECD countries are 
assumed to be concerned about consequences of the use of the environment on the welfare level in 
non-OECD countries. Moreover, the concern for the total environment seems to be more plausible 
in the case of a specified common environment (e.g., a closed sea such as the Baltic Sea) to be 
shared by a specified group of countries. Appendix II presents a formalisation of this analysis in the 
case of a shared common environment. Finally, maximising the total welfare first and then 
accounting for sustainability conditions (rather than in the opposite sequence) would lead to higher 
production and consumption in the more efficient OECD countries, at levels even larger than 
current production and consumption, with sustainability conditions for the weak sustainability and 
a-growth paradigms being less feasible. 
Note that a logarithmic transformation of the Cobb-Douglas utility functions permits analytical 
solutions. Moreover, apart from nature, welfare could be directly affected by other types of capital 
such as social, physical, and human capital, where these forms of capital, like nature, contribute to 
achieving a given consumption level. Finally, each parameter attached to an item of the Cobb-
Douglas utility function (e.g., α to consumption, β to the environment, γ to the welfare of future 
generations, δ to welfare of non-OECD current generations) can be related to the proportion of the 
budget spent to purchase it. Let us assume that a representative individual in the current generation 
is concerned about welfare inequality between OECD and non-OECD countries: 
𝑈C = [(𝑝N𝑈N)
1−ε + (𝑝S𝑈S)
1−ε]1/(1−ε) 
Where ε is the degree of aversion to intra-generational inequality (Asheim et al., 2012). Thus, the 
overall utility is given by: 
𝑈 = [𝑈C
1−ζ + 𝑈F
1−ζ]
1/(1−ζ)
 
6 
 
Where ζ is the degree of aversion to inter-generational inequality. Alternatively, a representative 
individual in the current generation could be concerned about inequality in use of the global 
environment between OECD and non-OECD countries: 
𝑊C = [𝐸N
1−ε + 𝐸S
1−ε]
1/(1−ε)
 
Thus, the overall welfare would be given by: 
𝑊 = [𝐸C
1−ζ + 𝐸F
1−ζ]
1/(1−ζ)
 
Note that the time discount rate is assumed to be 0, as this is the only value that is consistent with 
long-run equilibria. Moreover, each social utility or welfare function can be linked to an Atkinson 
inequality index, in which parameters ε and ζ have the same meaning. Finally, extreme values of ε 
and ζ (i.e., at 0 and 1) permit analytical solutions. 
Many theoretical definitions of the four sustainability paradigms can be suggested (Aznar-Marquez 
& Ruiz-Tamarit, 2016). Here, I will apply the analytical definitions summarised in Table 1. In other 
words, OECD and non-OECD countries are both assumed to adopt a cooperative rather than a non-
cooperative attitude, leading (for example) to a Nash equilibrium. This is realistic because currently, 
there is no coalition of OECD countries playing against the interests of non-OECD countries. 
Moreover, a non-cooperative context seems to be more plausible in the case of a specified group of 
countries exploiting a common environment. See Appendix II for formalisation of this analysis in 
the case of a shared common environment. Finally, referring to a non-cooperative context 
disregards the aversion to inter-generational inequality. 
Table 1. The analytical definitions of the four sustainability paradigms. U, overall utility in terms of 
consumption; UF, utility for the future generation; UC, total weighted utility for the current generation; EC, total 
weighted use of the environment by the current generation; EF, use of the environment by the future generation; 
XC, total weighted consumption by the current generation; XF, per capita consumption by the future generation; 
W, overall welfare in terms of the environment. 
Paradigm Analytical definition 
Weak sustainability Max U s.t. UF ≥ UC 
A-growth Max U s.t. EC ≤ EF 
De-growth Min XC s.t. UF ≥ UC 
Strong sustainability Max W s.t. EC ≤ EF 
 
Note that the analytical definition of de-growth does not depend on EN. This is consistent with the 
main critiques to this paradigm. Moreover, the four sustainability paradigms share couples of 
conditions: for example, Max U is shared by weak sustainability and a-growth; UF ≥ UC is shared 
by weak sustainability and de-growth; and EC ≤ EF is shared by a-growth and strong sustainability. 
Finally, the analytical definition of strong sustainability assumes that the parameters ε and ζ are set 
at 1. This is consistent with the main feature of this paradigm (i.e., maximum aversion to 
inequality). 
By solving for the sustainability requirements for consumption level and environment use in non-
OECD countries, and by using these expressions as inputs for the maximisation or minimisation 
problems that identify the four sustainability paradigms, it becomes possible to characterise these 
problems in terms of the variables for the OECD countries, for which solutions for XN and EN 
represent solutions for the world that meet global sustainability conditions. 
Note that weak inequalities will be solved as equalities. Moreover, other changes could affect 
equilibria: I will therefore perform a ceteris paribus analysis. Finally, dynamic stability conditions 
will not be considered, and static sustainability equilibria will be obtained. 
4. Data and normalisations 
Some parameters of the model developed in section 3 can be directly estimated. In particular, the 
proportions of the world’s current population in OECD and non-OECD countries, based on World 
Bank world development indicators (http://data.worldbank.org) data for 2012, are pN = 0.18 and pS 
= 0.82. If the per capita use of the global environment is measured by the ecological footprint (i.e., 
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the biologically productive area needed to provide everything an individual uses), sustainability of a 
representative individual for the world at the current population level requires EF to be at η = 1.7 ha 
(http://www.footprintnetwork.org), whereas the values for use of the environment in OECD and 
non-OECD countries, based on data for 2012, are 5.74 and 2.15 ha, respectively. The actual 
individual consumption as a percentage of GDP is available for each OECD country, with an 
average at 71.1%. Unfortunately, comparable data are not available for non-OECD countries, 
although their average is likely to be larger. Without significant loss of generality, I will assume that 
the per capita consumption is measured by the per capita income (i.e. GDP in USD, based on 
purchasing power parity [PPP]). Indeed, postponed consumption (as saving or investment) affects 
the welfare of future generations, but this welfare increase contributes to the current generation’s 
utility (i.e., both UN and US depend on UF). Moreover, consumption of imported goods (typically, in 
OECD countries) increases welfare where they are consumed, but their production might increase 
the use of the environment and so reduce welfare where they are produced and then exported 
(typically, in non-OECD countries). However, this welfare decrease in non-OECD countries 
contributes to the utility of OECD countries (i.e., UN depends on US). Finally, net exports equal net 
imports at the world level. Thus, the per capita consumption levels in OECD and non-OECD 
countries, based on world development indicators data for 2012, are US$36 727 GDP PPP and 
US$8216 GDP PPP, respectively. The current OECD generation’s aversion to inequality for the 
current non-OECD generation (ε) and the current generation’s aversion to inequality for future 
generations (ζ) are both in the range [0.01, 0.99]. 
Some parameters of the model developed in section 3 require additional assumptions or 
manipulations. In particular, the future population was normalised to 1. In other words, I compare 
representative individuals for the current and future world, with a change in the future population 
depicted by a change in the sustainable per-capita EF. Future consumption preferences are assumed 
to converge towards the preferences of the current OECD generation (i.e., αF = αN). This 
assumption seems to be consistent with the observed aspiration of the current non-OECD 
generation, whereas a future preference for consumption at a level that equals the average of current 
preferences seems to be more plausible in the case of a specified group of countries at similar levels 
of development. See Appendix II for formalisation of this analysis in the case of a shared common 
environment. 
The future generation achieves sustainability by relying on the environmental technology currently 
being applied by the OECD countries (i.e., θF = θN). In other words, complete technology transfer 
between developed and developing nations is optimistically assumed to be implemented in the 
future. Indeed, some technological convergence is likely to occur, although it is impossible to 
quantify the degree of this convergence. Moreover, a future technology that represents an average 
of the capabilities of current technologies seems to be more plausible in the case of a specified 
group of countries at similar levels of development. See Appendix II for formalisation of this 
analysis in the case of a shared common environment. Finally, this assumption does not affect the 
solutions for the a-growth and strong sustainability paradigms, but makes the solutions for the weak 
sustainability and de-growth paradigms less feasible. 
The remaining parameters of the model developed in section 3 can be indirectly estimated. In 
particular, since the benchmark scenario is characterised by OECD countries attaching the same 
importance (i.e., the same budget share) to consumption level, environmental preservation, the 
welfare of future generations, and the welfare of people in non-OECD countries; in this analysis, 
the budget share for consumption represents the parameter with the maximum budget share (i.e., the 
preference for consumption is realistically assumed not to be smaller than the concerns for the other 
issues), with the budget shares for all parameters summing up to 1. On this basis, I have fixed αN at 
0.25, and have normalised all other parameters with respect to this value (i.e., the observed budget 
shares are multiplied by 0.25). The OECD concern about the use of the environment (βN) is based 
on the assumption that 6.8% of GDP is devoted to the environment in OECD countries. This value 
was calculated by multiplying the observed average government expenditure on environmental 
protection as a percentage of GDP in OECD countries (i.e., 1.7% in the OECD data; 
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http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org) by 4, to account for both public and private expenditures as well as 
for both direct and indirect expenditures. That is, this assumes equal expenditures for each of these 
four categories of expenditure. Similarly, the current OECD generation’s concern for future 
generations (γN) is based on the average value of 4.8% of GDP devoted to green R&D and patents 
in OECD countries. This percentage was calculated by multiplying the average observed 
expenditure on environmental R&D and patents as a percentage of GDP observed in OECD 
countries (i.e., 2.4% in OECD data; http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org) by 2, to take into account both 
direct and indirect expenditures. That is, this assumes equal expenditures for public and private 
expenditures. Similarly, the current OECD generation’s concern for the current non-OECD 
generation (δN) is based on the assumption that 1.2% of GDP in OECD countries is devoted to 
providing development assistance. This is calculated by multiplying the average observed official 
government expenditure on development assistance as a percentage of GDP in OECD countries 
(i.e., 0.3% in OECD data; http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org) by 4 to account for both public and private 
expenditures as well as both direct and indirect expenditures. That is, this assumes equal 
expenditures for each of these four categories of expenditure. 
To facilitate comparisons between the numerical simulations, without significant loss of generality, 
I will normalise βN = γN = δN = 0.01 to represent an average share of GDP of 4% (i.e., 
[0.01/0.25]×100%). Unfortunately, comparable data are not available for non-OECD countries. 
Without significant loss of generality, I will assume that αS = αN (i.e., since only three parameters 
are inputs for US, this implies a greater importance attached to consumption for people in non-
OECD countries) and βS = γS = 0.005 (i.e., the current non-OECD generation’s concern over use of 
Earth resources and concern for future generations is assumed to be half of what is estimated for the 
current OECD generation). Indeed, all these figures are likely to be tiny but positive. 
5. Results 
In this section, for the sustainability paradigms described using the model developed in section 3, I 
will provide analytical solutions for cases based on extreme parameter values, and identify 
numerical solutions for cases based on the data and normalisations described in section 4. I will do 
this by relying on graphs that represent the relevant conditions within the whole problem domain 
for the OECD consumption level and use of the environment: XN in [0, 36.727] and EN in [0, 5.74], 
where 36.727 and 5.74 are the current values. These solutions are then characterised in terms of the 
alternative efficiency and equity approaches by referring to the following current (i.e., status quo) 
values: XF = 10.876, EF = 1.7, UF = 1.81, XC = 13.348, EC = 2.79, and UC = 1.82. 
5.1. Corner solutions 
In this section, I search for feasible solutions arising from changes in a single preference parameter 
to determine whether a single change can achieve sustainability. To do so, I measure feasibility in 
terms of acceptable welfare losses in OECD and non-OECD countries. 
For a situation in which there is no concern for nature, future generations, and non-OECD countries 
(i.e., βN = γN = δN = 0) in OECD countries, and in which there is no concern for nature and future 
generations (i.e., βS = γS = 0) in non-OECD countries, and for which the current generation’s 
aversion to inequality for the current non-OECD generation and the current generation’s aversion to 
inequality for future generations are both at their minimum (i.e., ε = ζ = 0), the analytical solutions 
for the four sustainability paradigms are as follows: 
For weak sustainability (i.e., first-order conditions for Max U and UF ≥ UC): 
𝑋N =
η αN
θN(𝑝NαN + 𝑝SαS)
 and 𝑋N ≤  exp
𝑈F
αN 𝑝N 𝑋S
−
αS 𝑝S
αN 𝑝N 
For a-growth (i.e., first-order conditions for Max U and EC ≤ EF): 
𝑋N =
η αN
θN(𝑝NαN + 𝑝SαS)
 and 𝑝NθN𝑋N + 𝑝SθS𝑋S ≤ η 
For de-growth (i.e., UF ≥ UC and XC ≤ XF): 
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 𝑋N ≤  exp
𝑈F
αN 𝑝N 𝑋S
−
αS 𝑝S
αN 𝑝N and 𝑝N𝑋N + 𝑝S𝑋S ≤ 𝑋F 
For strong sustainability (i.e., first-order conditions for Max W and EC ≤ EF): 
𝑋N =
η
θN
 and 𝑋S =
η
θS
 and 𝑝NθN𝑋N + 𝑝SθS𝑋S ≤ η 
Figure 1 illustrates the numerical solutions for these equations based on empirical data. 
Figure 1. Solutions for use of the environment (EN) as a function of per capita consumption (XN) for OECD 
countries based on current preferences: αN = αS = 0.25, βN = γN = δN = 0.01, βS = γS = 0.005, ε = ζ = 0.01. The 
cluster of curves represents the relationship between EN and XN for four values of (UF – UC)/UF, with the value 
decreasing from left to right. The thick decreasing curve to the right of this cluster represents the first-order 
conditions for Max U. The increasing straight line represents the border condition for EF ≤ EC. The horizontal 
straight line represents the first-order conditions for Max W. The highest, middle, and lowest dots are the 
representative OECD, world, and non-OECD individuals, respectively. 
 
For a situation in which there is no concern for future generations and non-OECD countries (i.e., γN 
= δN = 0) in OECD countries, and for which there is no concern for future generations (i.e., γS = 0) 
in non-OECD countries, and for which the current generation’s aversion to inequality for the 
current non-OECD generation and the current generation’s aversion to inequality for future 
generations are both at their minimum (i.e., ε = ζ = 0), the analytical solutions for the four 
sustainability paradigms are as follows: 
For weak sustainability (i.e., first-order conditions for Max U and UF ≥ UC): 
𝑋N =
η (αN − βN)
θN[𝑝N(αN − βN) + 𝑝S(αS − βS)]
 and 𝑋N
≤ exp 
𝑈F
(αN−βN) 𝑝N(𝑝NθN)
βN 𝑝N
(αN−βN) 𝑝N(𝑝SθS)
βS 𝑝S
(αN−βN) 𝑝N𝑋S
− 
(αS−βS) 𝑝𝑆
(αN−βN) 𝑝N 
For a-growth (i.e., first-order conditions for Max U and EC ≤ EF): 
𝑋N =
η (αN − βN)
θN[𝑝N(αN − βN) + 𝑝S(αS − βS)]
 and 𝑝NθN𝑋N + 𝑝SθS𝑋S ≤ η 
For de-growth (i.e., UF ≥ UC and XC ≤ XF): 
𝑋N ≤ exp 
𝑈F
(αN−βN) 𝑝N(𝑝NθN)
βN 𝑝N
(αN−βN) 𝑝N(𝑝SθS)
βS 𝑝S
(αN−βN) 𝑝N𝑋S
− 
(αS−βS) 𝑝𝑆
(αN−βN) 𝑝N and 𝑝N𝑋𝑁 + 𝑝𝑆𝑋𝑆 ≤ 𝑋F 
For strong sustainability (i.e., first-order conditions for Max W and EC ≤ EF): 
𝑋N =
η
θN
 and 𝑋S =
η
θS
 and 𝑝NθN𝑋N + 𝑝SθS𝑋S ≤ η 
Figure 2 illustrates the numerical solutions based on empirical data. 
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Figure 2. Solutions for use of the environment (EN) as a function of per capita consumption (XN) for OECD 
countries based on the perceived responsibility for nature: αN = αS= 0.25, βN = βS = 0.73, γN = δN = 0.01, γS = 0.005, 
ε = ζ = 0.01. The cluster of curves represents the relationship between EN and XN for four values of (UF – UC)/UF, 
with the value decreasing from top to bottom. The thick decreasing curve represents the first-order conditions 
for Max U. The increasing straight line represents the border condition for EF ≤ EC. The horizontal straight line 
represents the first-order conditions for Max W. The highest, middle, and lowest dots are the representative 
OECD, world, and non-OECD individuals, respectively. 
 
For a situation in which there is no concern for nature and non-OECD countries (i.e., βN = δN = 0) in 
OECD countries, and in which there is no concern for nature (i.e., γS = 0) in non-OECD countries, 
and in which the current generation’s aversion to inequality for the current non-OECD generation 
and the current generation’s aversion to inequality for future generations are both at their minimum 
(i.e., ε = ζ = 0), the analytical solutions for the four sustainability paradigms are as follows: 
For weak sustainability (i.e., first-order conditions for Max U and UF ≥ UC): 
𝑋N =
η αN
θN(𝑝NαN + 𝑝SαS)
 and 𝑋N ≤  exp
𝑈F
αN 𝑝N 𝑋𝑆
−
αS 𝑝S
αN 𝑝N 
For a-growth (i.e., first-order conditions for Max U and EC ≤ EF): 
𝑋N =
η αN
θN(𝑝NαN + 𝑝SαS)
 and 𝑝NθN𝑋N + 𝑝SθS𝑋S ≤ η 
For de-growth (i.e., UF ≥ UC and XC ≤ XF): 
𝑋N = exp
𝑈F
αN 𝑝N𝑋S
−
αS 𝑝S
αN 𝑝N𝑈F
−
γN𝑝N+γS 𝑝S
αN 𝑝N  and 𝑝N𝑋N + 𝑝S𝑋S ≤ 𝑋F 
For strong sustainability (i.e., first-order conditions for Max W and EC ≤ EF): 
𝑋N =
η
θN
 and 𝑋S =
η
θS
 and 𝑝NθN𝑋N + 𝑝SθS𝑋S ≤ η 
Figure 3 illustrates the numerical solutions based on empirical data. 
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Figure 3. Solutions for use of the environment (EN) as a function of per capita consumption (XN) for OECD 
countries based on a concern for future generations: αN = αS = 0.25, γN = γS = 0.73, βN = δN = 0.01, βS = 0.005, ε = ζ 
= 0.01. The cluster of curves represents the relationship between EN and XN for four values of (UF – UC)/UF, with 
the value decreasing from left to right. The thick decreasing curve to the right of this cluster represents the first-
order conditions for Max U. The increasing straight line represents the border condition for EF ≤ EC. The 
horizontal straight line represents the first-order conditions for Max W. The highest, middle, and lowest dots are 
the representative OECD, world, and non-OECD individuals, respectively. 
 
For a situation in which there is no concern for nature and future generations (i.e., βN = γN = 0) in 
OECD countries, and in which there is no concern for nature and future generations (i.e., βS = γS = 
0) in non-OECD countries, and in which the current generation’s aversion to inequality for the 
current non-OECD generation and the current generation’s aversion to inequality for future 
generations are both at their minimum (i.e., ε = ζ = 0), the analytical solutions for the four 
sustainability paradigms are as follows: 
For weak sustainability (i.e., first-order conditions for Max U and UF ≥ UC): 
𝑋N =  
αN η  ln[𝑋S]
θN(𝑝NδN+𝑝NαNln[𝑋S] + 𝑝SαSln[𝑋S])
 and 𝑋N ≤ αS
−
δN
αNexp
𝑈F
αN 𝑝N𝑋S
−
αS 𝑝S
αN 𝑝N ln[𝑋S]
−
δN
αN 
For a-growth (i.e., first-order conditions for Max U and EC ≤ EF): 
𝑋N =  
αN η  ln[𝑋S]
θN(𝑝NδN+𝑝NαNln[𝑋S] + 𝑝SαSln[𝑋S])
 and 𝑝NθN𝑋N + 𝑝SθS𝑋S ≤ η 
For de-growth (i.e., UF ≥ UC and XC ≤ XF): 
𝑋N = αS
−
δN
αNexp
𝑈F
αN 𝑝N𝑋S
−
αS 𝑝S
αN 𝑝N ln[𝑋S]
−
δN
αN and 𝑝N𝑋N + 𝑝S𝑋S ≤ 𝑋F 
For strong sustainability (i.e., first-order conditions for Max W and EC ≤ EF): 
𝑋N =
η
θN
 and 𝑋S =
η
θS
 and 𝑝NθN𝑋N + 𝑝SθS𝑋S ≤ η 
Figure 4 illustrates the numerical solutions based on empirical data. 
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Figure 4. Solutions for use of the environment (EN) as a function of per capita consumption (XN) for OECD 
countries based on a concern for non-OECD countries: αN = αS= 0.25, δN = 0.73, βN = γN = 0.01, βS = γS = 0.005, ε 
= ζ = 0.01. The cluster of curves represents the relationship between EN and XN for four values of (UF – UC)/UF, 
with the value decreasing from left to right. The thick decreasing curve to the right of this cluster represents the 
first-order conditions for Max U. The increasing straight line represents the border condition for EF ≤ EC. The 
horizontal straight line represents the first-order conditions for Max W. The highest, middle, and lowest dots are 
the representative OECD, world, and non-OECD individuals, respectively. 
 
For a situation in which there is no concern for nature, future generations, and non-OECD countries 
(i.e., βN = γN = δN = 0) in OECD countries, and in which there is no concern for nature and future 
generations (i.e., βS = γS = 0) in non-OECD countries, and in which the current generation’s 
aversion to inequality for the current non-OECD generation and the current generation’s aversion to 
inequality for future generations are at their maximum (i.e., ε = 1 so pN UN = pS US) and at their 
minimum (i.e., ζ = 0), respectively, the analytical solutions for the four sustainability paradigms are 
as follows: 
For weak sustainability (i.e., first-order conditions for Max U and UF ≥ UC): 
𝑋N = 𝑋S
αSpS
αNpN and  𝑋N ≤ exp
𝑈F
αN 𝑝N 𝑋S
−
αS 𝑝S
αN 𝑝N 
For a-growth (i.e., first-order conditions for Max U and EC ≤ EF): 
𝑋N = 𝑋S
αSpS
αNpN and 𝑝NθN𝑋N + 𝑝SθS𝑋S ≤ η 
For de-growth (i.e., UF ≥ UC and XC ≤ XF): 
𝑋N = exp
𝑈F
αN 𝑝N𝑋S
−
αS 𝑝S
αN 𝑝N and 𝑝N𝑋N + 𝑝S𝑋S ≤ 𝑋F 
For strong sustainability (i.e., first-order conditions for Max W and EC ≤ EF): 
𝑋N =
η
θN
 and 𝑋S =
η
θS
 and 𝑝NθN𝑋N + 𝑝SθS𝑋S ≤ η 
Figure 5 illustrates the numerical solutions based on empirical data. 
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Figure 5. Solutions for use of the environment (EN) as a function of per capita consumption (XN) for OECD 
countries based on aversion to inequality for non-OECD countries:αN = αS = 0.25, βN = γN = δN = 0.01, βS = γS = 
0.005, ε = 0.99, ζ = 0.01. The cluster of curves represents the relationship between EN and XN for four values of 
(UF – UC)/UF, with the value decreasing from left to right. The thick decreasing curve to the right of this cluster 
represents the first-order conditions for Max U. The increasing straight line represents the border condition for 
EF ≤ EC. The horizontal straight line represents the first-order conditions for Max W. The highest, middle, and 
lowest dots are the representative OECD, world, and non-OECD individuals, respectively. 
 
For a situation in which there is no concern for nature, future generations, and non-OECD countries 
(i.e., βN = γN = δN = 0) in OECD countries, and in which there is no concern for nature and future 
generations (i.e., βS = γS = 0) in non-OECD countries, and in which the current generation’s 
aversion to inequality for the current non-OECD generation and the current generation’s aversion to 
inequality for future generations are at their minimum (i.e., ε = 0) and at their maximum  (i.e., ζ = 1 
so UC = UF), respectively, the analytical solutions for the four sustainability paradigms are as 
follows: 
For weak sustainability (i.e., first-order conditions for Max U and UF ≥ UC): 
𝑋N = exp
𝑈F
αN 𝑝N𝑋S
−
αS 𝑝S
αN 𝑝N and  𝑋N ≤ exp
𝑈F
αN 𝑝N 𝑋S
−
αS 𝑝S
αN 𝑝N 
For a-growth (i.e., first-order conditions for Max U and EC ≤ EF): 
𝑋N = exp
𝑈F
αN 𝑝N𝑋S
−
αS 𝑝S
αN 𝑝N and 𝑝NθN𝑋N + 𝑝SθS𝑋S ≤ η 
For de-growth (i.e., UF ≥ UC and XC ≤ XF): 
𝑋N = exp
𝑈F
αN 𝑝N𝑋S
−
αS 𝑝S
αN 𝑝N and 𝑝N𝑋N + 𝑝S𝑋S ≤ 𝑋F 
For strong sustainability (i.e., first-order conditions for Max W and EC ≤ EF): 
𝑋N =
η
θN
 and 𝑋S =
η
θS
 and 𝑝NθN𝑋N + 𝑝SθS𝑋S ≤ η 
Figure 6 illustrates the numerical solutions based on empirical data. 
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Figure 6. Solutions for use of the environment (EN) as a function of per capita consumption (XN) for OECD 
countries based on aversion to inequality for future generations: αN = αS= 0.25, βN = γN = δN = 0.01, βS = γS = 
0.005, ε = 0.01, ζ = 0.99. The cluster of curves represents the relationship between EN and XN for four values of 
(UF – UC)/UF, with the value decreasing from left to right. The thick decreasing curve to the right of this cluster 
represents the first-order conditions for Max U. The increasing straight line represents the border condition for 
EF ≤ EC. The horizontal straight line represents the first-order conditions for Max W. The highest, middle, and 
lowest dots are the representative OECD, world, and non-OECD individuals, respectively. 
 
Figures 1 to 6 show that there are no solutions for weak sustainability, apart from the case with 
(extreme) responsibility for nature, whereas the other three sustainability paradigms always have 
solutions. Table 2 suggests that, with current preferences, a-growth and strong sustainability are 
slightly feasible, although these solutions are Gini-equitable for consumption, environment use, and 
welfare. Responsibility for nature makes all paradigms unfeasible. As expected, concern for future 
generations makes a-growth and strong sustainability feasible, and solutions are also MaxMin-
equitable for welfare; Gini-equitable for consumption, environment use, and welfare; and Pareto-
efficient. Surprisingly, a concern for non-OECD countries makes a-growth and strong sustainability 
moderately feasible, and solutions are Kaldor-Hicks efficient and Gini-equitable for consumption 
and environment use. Aversion to inequality for non-OECD countries makes a-growth and strong 
sustainability moderately and slightly feasible, respectively, with a reduction of welfare by 5% and 
16% for OECD and non-OECD countries, respectively, for a-growth; and by 25% and 5% for 
strong sustainability, respectively. In addition, all strong sustainability solutions are Gini-equitable 
for consumption, environment use, and welfare, whereas a-growth is Kaldor-Hicks efficient. 
Aversion to inequality for future generations makes a-growth and strong sustainability slightly 
feasible, with a reduction of welfare by 23% and 6% for OECD and non-OECD countries, 
respectively, for a-growth; and by 25% and 5% for strong sustainability, respectively. In addition, 
all solutions are Gini-equitable for consumption, environment use, and welfare. 
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Table 2. Feasibility (green = feasible, yellow = moderately feasible, red = slightly feasible, white = unfeasible), 
and levels and percent changes in consumption (X), environment use (E), and welfare (U). Efficiency (° = Pareto; 
underlined = Kaldor-Hicks) and equality (bold = MaxMin; italics = Gini). Current preferences (CP) = 
sustainability with today’s preferences; responsibility for nature exists if βN = βS = 0.73; concern for future 
generations exists if γN = γS = 0.73; concern for non-OECD countries exists if δN = 0.73; aversion to inequality for 
non-OECD countries exists if ε = 0.99; aversion to inequality for future generations exists if ζ = 0.99. 
Sustainability paradigms: WS, weak sustainability; AG, a-growth; DG, de-growth; SS, strong sustainability. 
 CP 
Responsibility 
for nature 
Concern for 
future 
generations 
Concern for non-
OECD countries 
Aversion to 
inequality for non-
OECD countries 
Aversion to 
inequality for 
future generations 
 Level 
Change 
% 
Level 
Change 
% 
Level 
Change 
% 
Level 
Change 
% 
Level 
Change 
% 
Level 
Change 
% 
WS 
            
XN   17.50 -52         
EN   1.15 -80         
UN   1.86 -24         
XS   5.64 -31         
ES   1.82 -15         
US   1.00 -41         
AG             
XN 12.67 -66 11.77 -68 12.68 -65 13.79 -62 29.90 -19 12.50 -66 
EN 1.98 -65 1.84 -68 1.98 -65 2.16 -62 4.67 -19 1.95 -66 
UN 1.89 -22 1.20 -51 2.92° 20 2.68 10 2.32 -5 1.89 -23 
XS 6.28 -24 6.40 -22 6.28 -24 6.13 -25 4.01 -51 6.30 -23 
ES 1.64 -23 1.67 -22 1.64 -23 1.60 -25 1.05 -51 1.64 -23 
US 1.58 -6 1.10 -35 2.44° 44 1.57 -7 1.42 -16 1.59 -6 
DG             
XN 10.63 -71 4.91 -87 1.74 -95 2.31 -94 10.63 -71 10.63 -71 
EN 1.66 -71 0.77 -87 0.27 -95 0.36 -94 1.66 -71 1.66 -71 
UN 1.82 -26 1.82 -26 1.82 -26 1.82 -26 1.82 -26 1.82 -26 
XS 6.55 -20 7.30 -11 7.71 -6 7.64 -7 6.55 -20 6.55 -20 
ES 1.71 -20 1.90 -11 2.01 -6 1.99 -7 1.71 -20 1.71 -20 
US 1.60 -5 1.03 -39 2.57 52 1.66 -2 1.60 -5 1.60 -5 
SS             
XN 10.87 -70 10.87 -70 10.87 -70 10.87 -70 10.87 -70 10.87 -70 
EN 1.70 -70 1.70 -70 1.70 -70 1.70 -70 1.70 -70 1.70 -70 
UN 1.83 -25 1.24 -49 2.82° 15 2.56 5 1.83 -25 1.83 -25 
XS 6.51 -21 6.51 -21 6.51 -21 6.51 -21 6.51 -21 6.51 -21 
ES 1.70 -21 1.70 -21 1.70 -21 1.70 -21 1.70 -21 1.70 -21 
US 1.60 -5 1.09 -36 2.46° 46 1.60 -5 1.60 -5 1.60 -5 
 
5.2. Interior solutions 
In this section, I search for feasible solutions arising from changes in all preference parameters 
related to a sense of concern or responsibility, for alternative values of the aversion to inequality 
parameters, by measuring feasibility in terms of acceptable welfare losses in OECD and non-OECD 
countries. 
Figures 7 to 9 show that there are no solutions for de-growth, whereas the other three sustainability 
paradigms have some solutions. Table 3 shows that weak sustainability is slightly feasible with 
small (and moderate) aversion to inequality: solutions are Gini-equitable for consumption, 
environment use, and welfare and Kaldor-Hicks efficient and Gini-equitable for consumption and 
welfare. A-growth is slightly feasible with all levels of aversion to inequality, although the 
sustainability burden is larger for people of the non-OECD countries at larger values of ε and ζ; 
solutions are Gini-equitable for consumption, environment use, and welfare with small and 
moderate ε and ζ, and Kaldor-Hicks efficient with moderate and large ε and ζ. Strong sustainability 
is always slightly feasible, regardless of ε and ζ; all solutions are Gini-equitable for consumption, 
environment use, and welfare. 
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Figure 7. Solutions for use of the environment (EN) as a function of per capita consumption (XN) for OECD 
countries based on all preference parameters related to a sense of concern or responsibility and small aversion to 
inequality: αN = βN = γN = δN = 0.25, αS= βS = γS = 0. 25, ε = ζ = 0.01. The cluster of curves represents the 
relationship between EN and XN for four values of (UF – UC)/UF, with the value decreasing from left to right. The 
thick decreasing curve represents the first-order conditions for Max U. The increasing straight line represents 
the border condition for EF ≤ EC. The horizontal straight line represents the first-order conditions for Max W. 
The highest, middle, and lowest dots are the representative OECD, world, and non-OECD individuals. 
 
Figure 8. Solutions for use of the environment (EN) as a function of per capita consumption (XN) for OECD 
countries based on all preference parameters related to a sense of concern or responsibility and medium aversion 
to inequality: αN = βN = γN = δN = 0.25, αS= βS = γS = 0. 25, ε = ζ = 0.50. The cluster of curves represents the 
relationship between EN and XN for four values of (UF – UC)/UF, with the value decreasing from left to right. The 
thick decreasing curve represents the first-order conditions for Max U. The increasing straight line represents 
the border condition for EF ≤ EC. The horizontal straight line represents the first-order conditions for Max W. 
The highest, middle, and lowest dots are the representative OECD, world, and non-OECD individuals. 
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Figure 9. Solutions for use of the environment (EN) as a function of per capita consumption (XN) for OECD 
countries based on all preference parameters related to a sense of concern or responsibility and large aversion to 
inequality: αN = βN = γN = δN = 0.25, αS= βS = γS = 0. 25, ε = ζ = 0.99. The cluster of curves represents the 
relationship between EN and XN for four values of (UF – UC)/UF, with the value decreasing from left to right. The 
thick decreasing curve represents the first-order conditions for Max U. The increasing straight line represents 
the border condition for EF ≤ EC. The horizontal straight line represents the first-order conditions for Max W. 
The highest, middle, and lowest dots are the representative OECD, world, and non-OECD individuals. 
 
Table 3. Feasibility levels (yellow = moderately feasible, red = slightly feasible, white = unfeasible), and percent 
changes in consumption (X), environment use (E) and welfare (U). Efficiency (underlined = Kaldor-Hicks) and 
equity (italics = Gini). Small, medium, and large aversion to inequality for non-OECD countries and future 
generations exist if ε = ζ = 0.01, ε = ζ = 0.50, and ε = ζ = 0.99, respectively. Sustainability paradigms: WS, weak 
sustainability; AG, a-growth; SS, strong sustainability. De-growth is not shown because there were no solutions 
(see Figures 7-9). 
 Small inequality aversion Medium inequality aversion Large inequality aversion 
 Level Change (%) Level Change (%) Level Change (%) 
WS       
XN 11.00 -70 17.50 -52   
EN 3.15 -45 5.40 -6   
UN 1.82 -25 2.03 -17   
XS 6.50 -21 5.64 -31   
ES 1.38 -35 0.89 -59   
US 1.60 -5 1.55 -8   
AG 
      
XN 12.70 -65 19.27 -48 26.70 -27 
EN 1.99 -65 3.01 -48 4.17 -27 
UN 1.89 -22 2.09 -14 2.26 -7 
XS 6.27 -24 5.41 -34 4.43 -46 
ES 1.64 -23 1.41 -34 1.16 -46 
US 1.58 -6 1.53 -10 1.45 -14 
SS 
      
XN 10.87 -70 10.87 -70 10.87 -70 
EN 1.70 -70 1.70 -70 1.70 -70 
UN 1.83 -25 1.83 -25 1.83 -25 
XS 6.51 -21 6.51 -21 6.51 -21 
ES 1.70 -21 1.70 -21 1.70 -21 
US 1.60 -5 1.60 -5 1.60 -5 
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5.3. Sensitivity analyses 
In this section, I search for feasible solutions at current preferences but in three different contexts: 
improved technology, decreased population, and modified consumption. Since the welfare of future 
generations is affected by all three context changes, I have modified the reference values 
accordingly: UF = 1.81 becomes UF = 1.95, 1.92, and 1.56 in contexts with changes in technology 
(θ), population (η), and consumption (α), respectively, whereas XF = 10.876 becomes XF = 14.502 
and 13.595 in contexts with changes in θ and η, respectively. 
Figures 10 to 12 show that there are no solutions for weak sustainability, whereas the other three 
sustainability paradigms always have solutions. Table 4 shows that improved technology makes a-
growth, de-growth, and strong sustainability slightly feasible. In addition, the solutions are Kaldor-
Hicks efficient; Gini-equitable for consumption, environment use, and welfare; and MaxMin-
equitable for consumption and welfare. Decreased population makes a-growth, de-growth, and 
strong sustainability slightly feasible. In addition, the solutions are Kaldor-Hicks efficient and Gini-
equitable for consumption, environment use, and welfare. Modified consumption makes a-growth 
slightly feasible and de-growth and strong sustainability moderately feasible. In addition, all 
solutions are Gini-equitable for consumption, environment use, and welfare. 
Figure 10. Solutions for use of the environment (EN) as a function of per capita consumption (XN) for OECD 
countries based on improved technology (i.e., increased environmental efficiency, θ): αN = αS = 0.25, βN = γN = δN 
= 0.01, βS = γS = 0.005, ε = ζ = 0.01, η = 1.7, θN = 0.1172, θS = 0.1957. The cluster of curves represents the 
relationship between EN and XN for four values of (UF – UC)/UF, with the value decreasing from left to right. The 
thick decreasing curve represents the first-order conditions for Max U. The increasing straight line represents 
the border condition for EF ≤ EC. The horizontal straight line represents the first-order conditions for Max W. 
The highest, middle, and lowest dots are the representative OECD, world, and non-OECD individuals, 
respectively. 
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Figure 11. Solutions for use of the environment (EN) as a function of per capita consumption (XN) for OECD 
countries based on reduced world population (η): αN = αS= 0.25, βN = γN = δN = 0.01, βS = γS = 0.005, ε = ζ = 0.01, 
η = 2.125, θN = 0.1563, θS = 0.2610. Numerical values on each curve represent (UF – UC)/UF. The cluster of curves 
represents the relationship between EN and XN for four values of (UF – UC)/UF, with the value decreasing from 
left to right. The thick decreasing curve represents the first-order conditions for Max U. The increasing straight 
line represents the border condition for EF ≤ EC. The horizontal straight line represents the first-order conditions 
for Max W. The highest, middle, and lowest dots are the representative OECD, world, and non-OECD 
individuals, respectively. 
 
Figure 12. Solutions for use of the environment (EN) as a function of per capita consumption (XN) for OECD 
countries based on changed consumption preferences (α): αN = αS = 0.1875, βN = γN = δN = 0.01, βS = γS = 0.005, ε 
= ζ = 0.01, η = 1.7, θN = 0.1563, θS = 0.2610. The cluster of curves represents the relationship between EN and XN 
for four values of (UF – UC)/UF, with the value decreasing from left to right. The thick decreasing curve 
represents the first-order conditions for Max U. The increasing straight line represents the border condition for 
EF ≤ EC. The horizontal straight line represents the first-order conditions for Max W. The highest, middle, and 
lowest dots are the representative OECD, world, and non-OECD individuals, respectively. 
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Table 4. Feasibility levels (green = feasible, yellow = moderately feasible, red = slightly feasible, white = 
unfeasible), and percent changes in consumption (X), environment use (E) and welfare (U). Efficiency 
(underlined = Kaldor-Hicks) and equality (bold = MaxMin; italic = Gini). Improved technology exists if θN = 
0.1172 and θS = 0.1957; decreased population exists if η = 2.125; modified consumption exists if αN = αS= 0.1875. 
Sustainability paradigms: AG, a-growth; DG, de-growth; SS, strong sustainability. Weak sustainability is not 
shown because there were no feasible solutions (see Figures 10-12). 
 Improved technology Decreased population Modified consumption 
 Level Change (%) Level Change(%) Level Change(%) 
AG       
XN 16.91 -54 15.83 -57 13.32 -64 
EN 1.98 -65 2.47 -57 2.08 -64 
UN 2.04 -16 2.00 -18 2.26 -7 
XS 8.37 2 7.85 -4 6.19 -25 
ES 1.64 -23 2.05 -4 1.62 -24 
US 1.70 1 1.67 -1 1.77 5 
DG       
XN 14.09 -62 13.35 -64 10.59 -71 
EN 1.65 -71 2.09 -64 1.66 -71 
UN 1.95 -20 1.92 -21 2.11 -14 
XS 8.74 6 8.17 -1 6.55 -20 
ES 1.71 -20 2.13 0 1.71 -20 
US 1.72 2 1.69 0 1.80 7 
SS       
XN 14.50 -61 13.59 -63 10.87 -70 
EN 1.70 -70 2.12 -63 1.70 -70 
UN 1.96 -19 1.93 -21 2.12 -13 
XS 8.68 6 8.14 -1 6.51 -21 
ES 1.70 -21 2.13 -1 1.70 -21 
US 1.72 2 1.69 0 1.80 6 
 
6. Discussion 
From a positive perspective, the insights about sustainability paradigms and value changes can be 
summarised as follows (Table 5). By considering the effects of modified consumption, decreased 
population and improved technology, the ordering of sustainability paradigms is a-growth > strong 
sustainability > de-growth > weak sustainability. Note that de-growth is unfeasible, by disregarding 
these effects. A sense of responsibility for nature β never produced feasible solution, whereas the 
ordering of other value changes is γ > δ > ε > ζ. Note that all senses of responsibility combined with 
medium inequality aversions are ranked II, like the effect of an improved technology θ; all senses of 
responsibility combined with small or large inequality aversions are ranked III, like the effects of 
modified consumption α and decreased population η. Thus, γ > δ = (β,γ,δ) with medium (ε,ζ) = θ > 
ε = α = η = (β,γ,δ) with small (ε,ζ) = (β,γ,δ) with large (ε,ζ) > current preferences = ζ. 
Table 5. Feasibility. CP = current preferences, Fea = feasible, Mod = moderately feasible, Sli = slightly feasible, 
blank = unfeasible. Sustainability paradigms: WS, weak sustainability; AG, a-growth; DG, de-growth; SS, 
strong sustainability. 
 
CP β γ δ ε ζ 
β, γ, δ with 
small ε, ζ 
β, γ, δ with 
medium ε, ζ 
β, γ, δ with 
large ε, ζ 
α η θ Rank 
WS 
      
Sli Sli 
    
IV 
AG Sli 
 
Fea Mod Mod Sli Sli Mod Mod Sli Sli Mod I 
DG 
         
Sli Sli Sli III 
SS Sli 
 
Fea Mod Sli Sli Sli Sli Sli Sli Sli Sli II 
Rank  
 
I II III IV III II III III III II 
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From a normative perspective, in terms of internal consistency, the insights about sustainability 
paradigms and value changes can be summarised as follows (Table 6). A case consistent with weak 
sustainability (i.e., Kaldor-Hicks efficient with small ε and ζ) has no solutions. A case consistent 
with a-growth (i.e., Gini-equitable for welfare with small ε and ζ) allows a choice between γ, δ, all 
senses of responsibility combined, and all context changes, although γ is more feasible. A case 
consistent with de-growth (i.e., MaxMin-equitable for welfare for any ε and ζ) must rely on context 
changes. A case consistent with strong sustainability (i.e., Gini-equitable for consumption and 
environment use for any ε and ζ) allows a choice between γ, ε, and ζ, all senses of responsibility 
combined, and all context changes, although γ is more feasible. In summary, by considering the 
effects of modified consumption, decreased population and improved technology, the ordering of 
sustainability paradigms is strong sustainability > a-growth > de-growth, whereas weak 
sustainability was never internally consistent. Note that de-growth is internally inconsistent, by 
disregarding these effects. Although modified consumption, decreased population and improved 
technology are ranked better than a sense of responsibility for future generations (i.e., α = η = θ > 
γ), the ordering of value changes is γ = (β,γ,δ) with all (ε,ζ) > δ = ε = ζ. 
Table 6. Internal consistency. Yes = internally consistent, blank = internally inconsistent. CP = current 
preferences. Sustainability paradigms: WS, weak sustainability; AG, a-growth; DG, de-growth; SS, strong 
sustainability. 
 
CP β γ δ ε ζ 
β, γ, δ with 
small ε, ζ 
β, γ, δ with 
medium ε, ζ 
β, γ, δ with 
large ε, ζ 
α η θ Rank 
WS 
      
  
    
IV 
AG 
  
Yes Yes 
  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes II 
DG 
         
Yes Yes Yes III 
SS 
  
Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes I 
Rank  
 
II III IV IV II II II I I I 
 
 
From a normative perspective, in terms of consistency with equity approaches, the insights about 
sustainability paradigms and value changes can be summarised as follows (Table 7). A case 
consistent with the utilitarian approach (here, Harsanyi; Kaldor-Hicks efficient with small ε and ζ) 
could be a-growth with a change in γ or δ, or strong sustainability with a change in γ or δ. 
With a focus on consumption or environment (here Dworkin; Gini-equitable for consumption or 
environment use), a case consistent with the egalitarian approach could be weak sustainability with 
all senses of responsibility combined and small or medium aversion to inequality; it could be a-
growth with current preferences, a change in γ, δ, or ζ, all preference parameters related to a sense 
of concern or responsibility with small or medium aversion to inequality, and all context changes; it 
could be de-growth with all context changes; or it could be strong sustainability with current 
preferences, a change in γ, δ, ε, or ζ, all preference parameters related to a sense of concern or 
responsibility with all aversion to inequality, and all context changes. 
With a focus on welfare (here, Arneson; Gini-equitable in welfare), a case consistent with the 
egalitarian approach could be weak sustainability with all preference parameters related to a sense 
of concern or responsibility and small or medium aversion to inequality; it could be a-growth with 
current preferences, a change in γ or ζ, all preference parameters related to a sense of concern or 
responsibility with all levels of aversion, and all context changes; it could be de-growth with 
context changes; it could be strong sustainability with current preferences, a change in γ, ε, or ζ, all 
preference parameters related to a sense of concern or responsibility with all levels of aversion, and 
all context changes. 
With a focus on consumption and environment (here, Sen; Gini-equitable in consumption and 
environment use), a case consistent with the egalitarian approach could be weak sustainability with 
all preference parameters related to a sense of concern or responsibility and small aversion to 
inequality; could be a-growth with current preferences, a change in γ, δ, or ζ, all preference 
parameters related to a sense of concern or responsibility with small or medium aversions, and all 
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context changes; could be de-growth with context changes; or could be strong sustainability with 
current preferences, a change in γ, δ, ε, or ζ, and all preference parameters related to a sense of 
concern or responsibility, with all levels of aversion, for all context changes. 
A case consistent with the contractarian approach (here, Rawls; MaxMin-equitable in consumption, 
environment use, or welfare) could be a-growth with a change in γ, improved technology and 
modified consumption; could be de-growth with improved technology and modified consumption; 
or could be strong sustainability with a change in γ, improved technology and modified 
consumption. In summary, by considering the effects of modified consumption, decreased 
population and improved technology, the ordering of sustainability paradigms is strong 
sustainability > a-growth > de-growth > weak sustainability. Note that de-growth is inconsistent 
with any equity approach, by disregarding these effects. Although modified consumption and 
improved technology are ranked better than a sense of responsibility for future generations (i.e., α = 
θ > γ > (β,γ,δ) with all (ε,ζ) = η > δ = ζ = current preferences > ε), the ordering of value changes is γ 
> δ = ζ > ε. 
Table 7. Consistency with equity approaches. Ut = utilitarian approach, Dw = Dworkin egalitarian approach, Ar 
= Arneson egalitarian approach, Se = Sen egalitarian approach, Co = contractarian approach, All = all equity 
approaches, blank = inconsistent with any equity approach. Sustainability paradigms: WS, weak sustainability; 
AG, a-growth; DG, de-growth; SS, strong sustainability. 
 
CP, ζ β γ δ ε 
β, γ, δ with 
all ε, ζ 
α, θ η Rank 
WS 
     
Dw-Ar-Se 
 
 IV 
AG Dw-Ar-Se 
 
All Ut-Dw-Se 
 
Dw-Ar-Se Dw-Ar-Se-Co Dw-Ar-Se II 
DG 
      
Dw-Ar-Se-Co Dw-Ar-Se III 
SS Dw-Ar-Se 
 
All Ut-Dw-Se Dw-Ar-Se Dw-Ar-Se Dw-Ar-Se-Co Dw-Ar-Se I 
Rank IV 
 
II IV V II I III 
 
 
Expected insights (to be taken as a validation of the model): 
1. An inter-generational sense of responsibility (γ) is the most important feature, although a 
concern for non-OECD countries (δ) also leads to sustainability with a-growth and strong 
sustainability. 
2. A population reduction makes de-growth feasible. 
3. Improved technology makes a-growth more feasible, and to a greater extent than with a 
population reduction. 
4. Modified consumption makes de-growth more feasible. 
5. Strong sustainability reduces inequality in consumption, environment use, and welfare in all 
scenarios, apart from welfare in a case with a concern for non-OECD countries (δ). 
Unexpected insights (to be taken as findings from the model): 
1. Aversion to inequality for non-OECD countries (ε) is more important than aversion to 
inequality for future generations (ζ), although people of non-OECD countries pay more with 
larger ε than with larger ζ, whereas the opposite holds for people in OECD countries. 
2. An increase in aversion to inequality for either non-OECD countries (ε) or for future 
generations (ζ) makes a-growth more feasible in cases with a sense of responsibility for 
nature (β) and current (δ) and future (γ) generations. 
3. Modified consumption makes strong sustainability more feasible. 
4. In a case with a sense of responsibility for both nature (β) and current (δ) and future (γ) 
generations, a-growth and strong sustainability lead to feasible sustainability conditions that 
provide similar welfare for OECD and non-OECD countries, despite differences in the 
representative individuals, if aversion to inequality both for non-OECD countries (ε) and for 
future generations is (ζ) small. 
5. A large sense of responsibility for nature (β) provides no feasible solutions for all 
sustainability paradigms. 
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Weaknesses of the present study: 
 Environmental free-riding (i.e., some individuals pay for the consequences of the 
environmental use by other individuals) is not modelled (e.g., in Appendix II, EN and ES are 
replaced by EC = ∑ pi Ei). However, welfare in OECD countries depends on welfare in non-
OECD countries, which in turn depends on their environmental use (i.e., UN depends on US, 
which depends on ES = 2 η – EN and ES = η/pS – (pN/pS) EN for non-weighted and weighted 
sustainability conditions, respectively). 
 The institutionalisation of sustainability (i.e., implementation of technical, legal, and moral 
systems; development of organisations, boards, and offices to implement sustainability 
strategies; Ott, 2014) is not discussed. However, most operational conditions that would lead 
towards sustainability are identified (e.g., δ should be preferred to γ). 
 Feasibility was defined based on arbitrary thresholds (i.e., a welfare reduction larger than 
25% was defined as unfeasible). However, comparisons between value changes and the four 
sustainability paradigms are independent of these thresholds (e.g., a-growth and strong 
sustainability should be preferred to weak sustainability, which should be preferred to de-
growth). 
Strengths of the present study: 
 The framework combines sustainability paradigms and equity approaches to find a 
theoretically coherent solution that can lead to sustainability or an operationally 
implementable policy that will lead to sustainability. 
 The results confirm insights in the literature on context changes such as modified 
consumption and improved technology (Zagonari, 2015), but they also expand these insights 
to include value changes by distinguishing among four sustainability paradigms and by 
considering proportions of the global population in OECD and non-OECD countries and the 
dynamics of these populations. 
 Neither a top-down nor a bottom-up approach to preference changes is suggested; instead, 
the most important features linked to each sustainability paradigm and equity approach are 
identified. 
Therefore, in normative terms, if the a priori commitment is a consistent sustainability paradigm, 
this study suggests a focus on γ (if a-growth or strong sustainability is adopted), δ (if a-growth is 
adopted), ε (if strong sustainability is adopted), ζ (if strong sustainability is adopted), all senses of 
concern or responsibility combined (if a-growth or strong sustainability is adopted), and all context 
changes (if a-growth, de-growth, or strong sustainability is adopted). Moreover, in normative terms, 
if the a priori commitment is a consistent equity approach, this paper suggests a focus on γ (in the 
case of utilitarian, egalitarian, or contractarian approaches), δ (in the case of utilitarian or egalitarian 
approaches), ε (in the case of an egalitarian approach), and ζ (in the case of an egalitarian 
approach). Finally, in positive terms, the most effective sustainability conditions, regardless of 
consistency of the adopted paradigm or approach, appear to be γ > δ > ε > ζ for value changes and 
a-growth > strong sustainability > de-growth > weak sustainability for sustainability paradigms. 
7. Conclusions 
Three main novel findings were obtained in this study. First, weak sustainability and de-growth, 
which include the constraint UF ≥ UC, are both theoretically problematic to sustain and empirically 
difficult to implement, since the happiness or needs of future generations, which depend on spatial 
and temporal variations in culture, cannot be easily defined or measured. Second, sustainability 
conditions cannot be achieved by relying only on a sense of responsibility for nature, but instead 
must rely on a concern for both future generations and non-OECD countries. In other words, relying 
on a sense of responsibility for nature, which only indirectly affects future generations, is 
theoretically ineffective; indeed, welfare losses in the absence of concern for future generations and 
non-OECD countries are large under all paradigms, although sustainability conditions differ among 
the paradigms. Relying on a sense of responsibility for nature is also operationally difficult; for 
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example, agreements between religions are difficult to achieve, since their philosophies have 
evolved from different cultural backgrounds and histories. Third, the perspective of a single 
individual (i.e., the focus is on individual sustainability) and a representative individual (i.e., the 
focus is on overall sustainability) that are assumed by a-growth and strong sustainability, 
respectively, leads to sustainability at similar levels of per capita consumption and use of the 
environment by both OECD and non-OECD countries. 
The main theoretical good news from this study is that the ecological debt (i.e., the current average 
ecological footprint of 2.79 ha is larger than the long-run equilibrium value at 1.7 ha), and can be 
paid in full by the current generation if there is significant concern for future generations and non-
OECD countries, although the welfare burden depends on the possible preference changes and the 
distribution of this burden depends on the adopted sustainability paradigms. 
The main operational good news is threefold. First, sustainability can be achieved at current 
preferences with reasonable burdens for current generations in OECD and non-OECD countries if 
a-growth or strong sustainability is adopted. Second, improved technology and modified 
consumption could increase welfare for the current non-OECD generation compared with the status 
quo. Third, whenever a feasible solution exists, the sustainability burden on current OECD 
generations is proportionally larger than that on current non-OECD generations. 
The main theoretical bad news is that two of the four sustainability paradigms are not internally 
consistent: weak sustainability was never Kaldor-Hicks efficient (with and without context 
changes), whereas de-growth was never MaxMin-equitable (without context changes). 
The main operational bad news is threefold. First, achieving sustainability implies an increase in 
inter-generational inequality: the current unsustainable representative individual for the world is 
closer to the future sustainable representative individual than to the current sustainable 
representative individual in terms of both consumption and environment use in all sustainability 
paradigms. Second, reducing the world’s population, as endorsed by the de-growth paradigm, is not 
enough to achieve sustainability, although the current non-OECD generation would not decrease its 
status quo welfare if strong sustainability or de-growth were adopted. Third, if the suggested 
changes in preferences related to a sense of concern or responsibility are interpreted as changes in 
the budget share, sustainability conditions appear difficult to achieve. 
Three main developments from this paper seem to be particularly promising. First, it should be 
possible to move from aggregated data to more detailed data on consumption levels. This would 
allow the inclusion of expenditures for health and education, possibly at a national level. Second, it 
should be possible to enhance the current one-shot model to produce a dynamic model, which 
would allow an investigation of issues related to overlapping generations. Third, moving from 
aggregated data to more detailed data on the direct and indirect use of Earth’s resources would 
allow the framework to account for both pollution production and resource use, possibly at a 
national level. 
Appendix I 
αF: the future preference for consumption 
αN: the preference for consumption in OECD countries 
αS: the preference for consumption in non-OECD countries 
βN: the degree of concern for nature in OECD countries 
βS: the degree of concern for nature in non-OECD countries 
γN: the degree of concern for future generations in OECD countries 
γS: the degree of concern for future generations in non-OECD countries 
δN: the degree of concern for the current non-OECD generation in OECD countries 
ε: the degree of aversion to intra-generational inequality 
ζ: the degree of aversion to inter-generational inequality 
η: per capita equilibrium use of the environment consistent with the current world population 
θN: the use of the environment for each consumption unit for the OECD current generation 
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θS: the use of the environment for each consumption unit for the non-OECD current generation 
θF: the use of the environment for each consumption unit for the future generation 
EC: population-weighted per capita use of the environment by the current generation 
EF: per capita use of the environment by the future generation 
EN: per capita use of the environment in the current OECD generation 
ES: per capita use of the environment in the current non-OECD 
pN: proportion of the global population in the OECD countries 
pS: proportion of the global population in the non-OECD countries 
U: overall utility as dependent on consumption 
UC: population-weighted utility of the current generation as dependent on consumption 
UF: utility of the future generation as dependent on consumption 
UN: utility of the current OECD generation as dependent on consumption 
US: utility of the current non-OECD generation as dependent on consumption 
W: overall welfare as dependent on environment use 
WC: population-weighted welfare of the current generation as dependent on environment use 
XC: population-weighted per capita consumption in the current generation 
XF: per capita consumption in the future generation 
XN: per capita consumption in the OECD current generation 
XS: per capita consumption in the non-OECD current generation 
Appendix II 
In the case of n countries at a similar development level, and which share a common environment 
(e.g., a closed sea), the model changes as follows: 
𝑈𝐹 = 𝑋𝐹αF with αF =
1
𝑛
∑ α𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
 and 𝑋𝐹 =  η θF with θF⁄ =
1
𝑛
∑ θ𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
 
𝑈𝐶𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖
α𝑖 (∑ 𝑝𝑖𝐸𝑖)
−β𝑖
𝑈𝐹𝛾𝑖 (∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑈𝐶𝑗)
δ𝑖
 
𝑈𝐶 = [(∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑈𝐶𝑖)
1−ε
]
1/(1−ε)
 
𝑈 = [𝑈𝐶1−𝜁 + 𝑈𝐹1−ζ]
1/(1−ζ)
 
𝑊𝐶 = [(∑ 𝑝𝑖𝐸𝑖)
1−ε
]
1/(1−ε)
 
𝑊 = [𝐸𝐶1−ζ + 𝐸𝐹1−ζ]
1/(1−ζ)
 
Where i refers to a sum which includes all n countries, whereas j refers to a sum which excludes 
country i. Note that this system of equations could be solved for Xi to check for the existence of a 
sustainability solution at current preferences. Alternatively, it could be solved for a set of 
consumption preferences (i.e., αi, βi, γi, δi, ε, ζ) at current consumption levels to check which 
country should change its preferences to a greater extent. Moreover, UF ≥ Ui could be used instead 
of UF ≥ UC. Finally, the model could be solved in a cooperative context, in which δi could be 
positive. Alternatively, it could be solved in a non-cooperative context, in which δi is set to 0. 
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